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Philosophy and T heology
In November 2007, the Committee on Ethics of the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) issued committee opinion 385, titled 
“The Limits of Conscientious Refusal in Reproductive Medicine.”1 The committee 
enumerated a series of recommendations that “maximize accommodation of an 
individual’s religious or moral beliefs while avoiding imposition of these beliefs on 
others or interfering with the safe, timely, and financially feasible access to repro­
ductive health care that all women deserve.”1 2 These recommendations include the 
following seven provisions:
1. In the provision of reproductive services, the patient’s well-being must be 
paramount. Any conscientious refusal that conflicts with a patient’s well­
being should be accommodated only if the primary duty to the patient can 
be fulfilled.
2. Health care providers must impart accurate and unbiased information so that 
patients can make informed decisions about their health care. They must 
disclose scientifically accurate and professionally accepted characterizations 
of reproductive health services.
1 American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Committee on Ethics, 
“The Limits of Conscientious Refusal in Reproductive Medicine,” opinion no. 385, Novem­
ber 2007, http://www.acog.org/from_home/publications/ethics/co385.pdf. This opinion has 
generated several critiques. See, for example, American Association of Pro Life Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists, “Response to the ACOG Ethics Committee Opinion #385,” February 
6, 2008, http://www.aaplog.org/responsetoacogethicscommittee385_2-6-08.pdf; and Dr. 
Bob Orr of the Christian Medical and Dental Association, “Critique of ACOG Committee 
Opinion # 385,” http://www.cmda.org/AM/Template.cfm?Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay. 
cfm&ContentID=10375.
2 ACOG, “Limits of Conscientious Refusal,” 2.
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3. Where conscience implores physicians to deviate from standard practices, 
including abortion, sterilization, and provision of contraceptives, they must 
provide potential patients with accurate and prior notice oftheir personal moral 
commitments. In the process of providing prior notice, physicians should not 
use their professional authority to argue or advocate these positions.
4. Physicians and other health care professionals have the duty to refer patients 
in a timely manner to other providers if they do not feel that they can in 
conscience provide the standard reproductive services that their patients 
request.
5. In an emergency in which referral is not possible or might negatively affect 
a patient’s physical or mental health, providers have an obligation to provide 
medically indicated and requested care regardless of the provider’s personal 
moral objections.
6. In resource-poor areas, access to safe and legal reproductive services should 
be maintained. Conscientious refusals that undermine access should raise 
significant caution. Providers with moral or religious objections should either 
practice in proximity to individuals who do not share their views or ensure 
that referral processes are in place so that patients have access to the service 
that the physician does not wish to provide. Rights to withdraw from caring 
for an individual should not be a pretext for interfering with patients’ rights 
to health care services.
7. Lawmakers should advance policies that balance protection of providers’ 
consciences with the critical goal of ensuring timely, effective, evidence- 
based, and safe access to all women seeking reproductive services.3
In order to justify these recommendations, the opinion of the committee appeals 
to a definition of conscience as “the private, constant, ethically attuned part of the 
human character. . . . An appeal to conscience would express a sentiment such as, 
“If I were to do ‘x,’ I could not live with myself/ I would hate myself/ I wouldn’t be 
able to sleep at night.”4
Certain elements of the definition of conscience proposed by the ACOG 
committee are unobjectionable, such as the desire to avoid inner discord and the 
“ethically attuned” aspect of conscience which hints at a response to something 
objective. A concern for patient well-being is certainly laudable. However, on the 
whole, the foundation of the seven ACOG recommendations as well as many of the 
recommendations themselves are at odds with a sound understanding of ethics and 
conscience and furthermore fail to appreciate, or respect, the genuine pluralism that 
exists about the nature and claims of conscience.
The committee’s understanding of conscience reflects a particular philosophical 
view, one that can hardly be taken as self-evident. It is not made clear in the document
3 Ibid., 5.
4 Ibid., 2.
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why this peculiar account of conscience (perhaps originating with Thomas Hobbes) 
was adopted, nor why this one philosophical view of ethics and conscience should be 
imposed on the entire membership of the ACOG. With Hobbes, the ACOG guidelines 
presuppose that ethics is ultimately a matter of the private emotions and sentiments 
rather than a matter of common rationality and practical wisdom, as Plato, Aristotle, 
Cicero, Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant, John Henry Newman, and Simon Solovey- 
chik held. The difference between a properly formed conscience and a malformed 
conscience consists in part in that a properly formed conscience reflects an ethical 
soundness which is not an idiosyncratic private taste, but rather may be a communally, 
publicly shared judgment precisely because it is based on shared rationality.
In the ACOG opinion, conscience reflects not one’s best judgment at the con­
clusion of a process of moral deliberation from fundamental moral principles about 
what is right and wrong all things considered (ultima facie), but a feeling that is 
merely a matter of a provider’s personal experience of loss of self-respect. “Although 
respect for conscience is a value, it is only a prima facie value, which means it can 
and should be overridden in the interest of other moral obligations that outweigh 
it in a given circumstance.”5 The committee opinion thus construes claims of con­
science as prima facie values that can and should be “overridden” by the agent in 
light of other moral considerations. When this idiosyncratic desire not to feel shame 
is set against the well-being of a patient, naturally the patient’s well-being trumps 
the private, sentimental desire to keep one’s hands clean. The ACOG conception of 
conscience as a prima facie guide contradicts, for example, the proximate supremacy 
of conscience as an unconditional command (Kant), a magisterial dictate (Newman), 
and the famous dictum of conscience, “were its might equal to its right, it would rule 
the world” (Butler). Sophocles in Antigone, Socrates in the Crito, and Aquinas in the 
Summa theologiae (I-II, Q 19.5) all testify that an agent’s best ethical judgment—the 
judgment of conscience—simply cannot be overridden.
Not only is the ACOG’s definition of conscience only one among many under­
standings of conscience and hardly representative, but also its peculiar definition is 
problematic in two additional respects. First, there is no reason why conscience must 
be constant, for people can and should change their consciences to accord with the 
truth as best as they can determine it. Second, the violation of conscience does not 
necessarily lead to emotional turmoil or subjective feelings of guilt (“If I were to 
do ‘x,’ I could not live with myself/ I would hate myself/ I wouldn’t be able to sleep 
at night”). A violation of conscience makes the agent objectively guilty for having 
knowingly and willingly done something against the agent’s best ethical judgment. 
Being guilty in this sense is fully compatible with a wide range of emotional reac­
tions. The wicked sometimes sleep soundly.
The idiosyncratic foundation of the ACOG document’s recommendations is 
not only philosophically (and theologically) problematic from a diverse variety of 
perspectives (such as those represented by Sophocles, Socrates, Aquinas, Kant, 
Butler, Newman, and Soloveychik), but the recommendations themselves are also
5 Ibid., 3.
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highly objectionable. “Physicians and other health care professionals have the duty 
to refer patients in a timely manner to other providers if they do not feel that they 
can in conscience provide the standard reproductive services that patients request.”6 
A pro-life physician could follow the letter of this recommendation and refer a pa­
tient to another pro-life doctor. However, if construed (as seemingly intended by 
the committee) as a duty to refer to a doctor who has no conscientious objection 
to abortion, this recommendation proposes a duty to cooperate in the wrongdoing 
of another by not merely providing what is needed to commit wrongdoing, but by 
helping patients precisely in their wrongdoing. It would indeed be absurd to say, “I 
would have a guilty conscience if she did ‘x.’”7 However, it is not at all absurd to 
say, “I would have a guilty conscience if I helped her to do ‘x.’” Conscience may or 
may not demand that one rebuke or obstruct other providers, but it surely demands 
that one not formally assist in the wrongdoing. This becomes intuitively clear when 
we substitute for “x” something uncontroversially evil. Would it really “absolve” a 
physician from guilt if he did not personally prescribe a drug in order for a patient 
to commit date rapes, but rather helped the rapist achieve his goal by referring him 
to another doctor to fill the prescription? It is true that some patients would still do 
“x” even without a referral. However, formal cooperation in the wrongdoing of others 
is not eliminated simply because the wrongdoer is intent on doing wrong regardless 
of the cooperation given.
One would have strong reason to suspect that the ACOG has chosen its definition 
of conscience precisely to yield the specific recommendations that it wanted, given 
that the ACOG’s previous policy positions would imply a very different understanding 
ofthe nature, scope, and claims of conscience. Previously, the ACOG has championed 
the individual judgment of the physician about what counts as medically indicated 
for a patient in particular circumstances as a buttress against laws criminalizing 
abortion procedures. On this view, if a particular physician believes it is in the best 
interest of the health of the woman to have an abortion, then this judgment qualifies 
the procedure as legal under the guidelines set by Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton. 
In the words of the ACOG statement of policy on abortion (reaffirmed in 2004), a 
partial-birth abortion “may be the best or most appropriate procedure in a particular 
circumstance to save the life or preserve the health of the woman, and only the doctor, 
in consultation with the patient, based on the woman’s particular circumstances can 
make that decision. . . . The intervention of legislative bodies into medical decision 
making is inappropriate, ill advised, and dangerous.”8 It would seem then that the 
judgment of the individual physician about what is medically indicated trumps any 
sort of universalized ruling that abstracts for the particularities of the situation as 
understood by the physician chosen by the patient. However, some physicians in 
conscience refuse to provide contraceptives or perform abortions because, having
6 Ibid., 5.
7 Ibid., 2.
8 ACOG Statement of Policy, “Abortion Policy,” January 1993 (reaffirmed July 1994), 
3; available at http://www.sdhealthyfamilies.org/media/pdf/ACOGAbortionPolicy.pdf.
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examined the empirical evidence,9 in their judgment these practices are contrary to 
the well-being of their patients. In these cases, when an affirmation of the autonomy 
of a physician in determining medically indicated care might result in an abortion 
not being performed, opinion 385 overrides the judgment ofthe treating physician in 
favor of “standard care” as determined by the ACOG, a kind of legislative body.
The ACOG opinion not only unfairly limits a doctor’s liberty in action but 
also infringes on a physician’s freedom of speech. In other contexts, the ACOG has 
argued against “gag rules” that inhibit a physician from communicating to the pa­
tient about what is, in the physician’s judgment, relevant for making sure the patient 
can give informed consent and proper treatment. “Serious ethical problems arise if 
organizational rules (so-called “gag rules”) preclude such disclosures.”10 However, 
in opinion 385, physicians may not even communicate their own views about treat­
ment unless they parrot “professionally accepted characterizations of reproductive 
health services.” Freedom of speech is therefore sharply curtailed, since doctors are 
expressly forbidden “to argue or advocate” views that dissent from ACOG committee 
policy. Such physicians are also forced, even in contexts where such matters may 
not be at issue, to make their views known to patients, and yet at the same time the 
new ACOG gag rule forbids them to indicate why they hold these views.
The flawed understanding of conscience accepted by opinion 385 actually 
commits the ACOG, by extension and analogy, to positions that reasonable people 
would in other circumstances find repugnant. This may be seen by substituting other 
practices for abortion and contraception. The same rules, for example, adopted in a 
different cultural and legal milieu, would only allow a conscientious objector not to 
perform female genital mutilation (FGM) so long as the objector were forced to refer 
patients to those who do perform female genital mutilation, and as long as someone 
else were available. If the physician responds that female genital mutilation goes 
against his conception of good medicine, not only must the physician act in certain 
circumstances against what he believes is medically indicated, but the objector must 
also mouth to the patient or guardian “professionally accepted characterizations” of 
the practice, as understood in the predominant cultural and enforced legal milieu 
without “use of their professional authority to argue or advocate” against FGM.
9 See Royal College of Psychiatrists, “Position Statement on Women’s Mental Health 
in Relation to Induced Abortion,” Times Online, March 14, 2008, http://extras.timesonline. 
co.uk/abortion.pdf. See also Thomas W. Strahan, Detrimental Effects o f  Abortion: An 
Annotated Bibliography with Commentary, 3rd ed. (Springfield, IL: Acorn Books, 2001); 
Elizabeth Ring-Cassidy and Ian Gentles, Women’s Health after Abortion: The Medical 
and Psychological Evidence, 2nd ed. (Toronto: deVeber Institute for Bioethics and Social 
Research, 2003); and C. Kahlenborn et. al., “Oral Contraceptive Use as a Risk Factor for 
Premenopausal Breast Cancer: A Meta-analysis” Mayo Clinic Proceedings 81.10 (2006): 
1290-1302.
10 ACOG Committee on Ethics, “Ethical Decision Making in Obstetrics and Gynecol­
ogy,” opinion no. 390, December 2007, 6, http://www.acog.org/from_home/publications/eth- 
ics/co390.pdf.
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Would such rules, for the physician practicing in places where FGM is legally and 
culturally accepted, provide an adequate protection (let alone “maximize accom­
modation”) for the doctor conscientiously objecting to FGM?
Consider examples closer to home. A physician working in a correctional fa­
cility is asked to facilitate giving a lethal injection to a prisoner on death row. The 
physician firmly believes that capital punishment is immoral and further, having 
closely followed this prisoner’s case, is convinced the condemned is actually innocent. 
However, let us suppose that state law allows only employees of the correctional 
facility to be in the room during the execution, and since he is the only physician 
employed in the prison, according to the principles for conscience set by the ACOG, 
the physician has a duty to execute the prisoner. Likewise, in places where euthanasia 
or physician-assisted suicide is legal, similar conscience guidelines would require 
physicians opposed to these practices to kill or help kill their patients if no other 
physician is available.
Part of the argument made by the ACOG is that the obligations undertaken by 
the physician’s acceptance of his role as physician (and the privileges this entails) 
bind the doctor more firmly than the judgment of conscience. However, it in no way 
follows that undertaking certain obligations vacates the demands of conscience. 
Ironically, the committee report would undermine the autonomy of physicians to 
an even greater degree than a military oath to obey superior officers limits the au­
tonomy of soldiers. A man volunteering for military service freely takes an oath to 
obey his superior and receives all the privileges and responsibilities that come with 
that oath. But let us suppose his lawful superior orders him to do something that the 
soldier considers to be immoral. In the understanding of conscience imposed by the 
ACOG committee, a soldier could disobey an order only if there were other soldiers 
available to carry it out. If not, then the solider has a duty to carry out the order 
that he considers immoral. Surely, however, the demands of conscience must not be 
gerrymandered by the availability of less enlightened and conscientious people.
One of the concerns of the committee is that the exercise of conscientious 
objection not create or reinforce racial discrimination or socioeconomic inequali­
ties in society. However, the ACOG opinion itself encourages unfair discrimination 
against anyone who refuses to take innocent human life, including many religious 
believers, particularly Catholics. Any Catholic who accepts the teaching of the 
Church will be unable to practice medicine in accordance with the recommendations 
of the committee. Like any intentional killing of innocent human beings, perform­
ing abortions violates Catholic teaching, and indeed when knowingly and willing 
done, the agent who procures an abortion “incurs an automatic (latae sententiae) 
excommunication” (can. 1398). Circumstances—such as practicing medicine in a 
remote location—might lead to a situation in which a Catholic doctor is the only 
physician available to perform an abortion, and under the rules of the committee 
would therefore be required to do so. In a more typical case, the committee opinion 
seems to require a conscientious objector to refer a woman for abortion to a provider 
who will perform the abortion. In other words, it requires the conscientious objector 
to cooperate in the abortion. As Bishop Rene H. Gracida notes, “Accomplices are 
also subject to the penalty of excommunication if the abortion would not have been
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committed without their efforts (canon 1329.2).”11 Thus, if the referral were really 
needed in order to perform the abortion, the one making the referral would seem 
to share in the penalty of automatic excommunication. And if the referral were not 
really needed in order to secure the abortion, it is difficult to see why the physician 
should be required to perform a superfluous act, other than to mislead a patient about 
the physician’s views on abortion.
Conscientious Catholic physicians cannot act in accordance with the commit­
tee’s regulations. The committee view creates a professional environment discourag­
ing if not prohibitive to Catholics and certain other faithful Christians who oppose 
abortion. Thus, in effect, opinion 385 also reinforces prejudice and discrimination 
against ethnic minority groups who are disproportionately Catholic and Evangelical, 
such as Latinos and African-Americans.
The many difficulties occasioned by opinion 385 could be reasonably avoided, 
and the legitimate autonomy of both patients and doctors secured, by recognizing 
the proper scope of liberty on all sides. Physicians have the autonomy to determine 
what is in their view medically indicated for the patients they serve, and to deter­
mine whether they are willing to provide this service; patients have the autonomy 
to reject or accept any options offered by their physicians as well as the freedom 
to choose their physician. Either side may misuse their autonomy, but as a prima 
facie starting point this seems much preferable to the one-sided emphasis on patient 
autonomy found in the committee opinion. Physicians should not be cast into the 
role of medical automatons forced to perform actions contrary to their best ethical 
and medical judgments.
Ch r is t o p h e r  Ka c z o r , Ph .D. 
The Catholic University of America 
Washington, D.C.
11 Bishop Rene H. Gracida, D.D., “Choose Life, Not Death! A Pastoral Letter on 
Abortion and Excommunication,” September 8, 1990, http://www.priestsforlife.org/mag- 
isterium/gracida.htm.
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